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LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

doctrine of ordre public will be faced with applying and construing the
Articles of Agreement under which nations have relinquished the protection of the public policy of the forum to the larger world policy of
monetary cooperation. The hope must be, therefore, that courts as
well as nations will not lose sight of the Fund Agreement's paramount
purposes to establish exchange stability and equilibrium in balance of
payments, with the ultimate aim of eradicating human distress resulting
from economic chaos.
SARAH E. PARKER

Survey of the United States Supreme Court Decisions Affecting
Labor-Management Relations During the 1967-1968 Term
INTRODUCTION

The labor law decisions of the Supreme Court during the 1967-1968
term were significant primarily in their attempt to reconcile the rights
of individuals with the power of those interests controlling collective
bargaining groups. Throughout the opinions institutional power, whatever its form, is closely examined by the Court when such power appears
to infringe upon individual or minority rights. In addition, the cases last
term show an increased willingness on the part of the Court to enlarge
the power of those agencies and officials who traditionally safeguard the
rights of union members.
Also decided by the Court last term were two opinions specifically aimed
at employer actions, one case presenting a first amendment question in the
area of picketing, an opportunity, which the Court declined, to settle the
conflict between section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act' and section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act.2 A total of twelve labor law
opinions were rendered by the Court, and this comment will present an
analytical digest of them.
UNION ELECTIONS

The Supreme Court heard three cases last term involving the interpretation of Title IV of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
' Norris-LaGuardia Act, § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
261 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
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Act (LMRDA) . The congressional debates concerning union election
provisions indicated a need to protect the right of the rank-and-file union
members to participate fully in the democratic processes of their unions
and to insure the union leadership's responsiveness to the membership,
and section 401' was ostensibly designed to implement these policies.
One requirement0 of Section 401 is that every member in good standing be allowed to run as a candidate for union office, subject to "reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed." In Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel, &
Club Employees Union, Local 6,7 the Court held that a union bylaw limiting eligibility for major elective offices to union members who hold or
have held a minor union elective office "is not a reasonable qualification"
under this section. The district court' had agreed with this interpretation
of the statute, but the court of appeals 9 was persuaded by the argument
that a union cannot entrust the administration of its affairs to untrained
and inexperienced rank-and-file members, and thus did not think it unreasonable for a union to condition candidacy upon experience and training. The Supreme Court, however, declared that democratic elections can
be "seriously impaired by candidacy qualifications which substantially
deplete the ranks of those who might run in opposition to incumbents."' 1
The effect of the bylaw was to render only seven per cent of the member-

ship eligible to run for office, and "[p]lainly, given the objective of Title
'Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519, 29
U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964) [the Act will hereinafter be referred to as LMRDA].
'See

REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN THE LABOR OR

No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
LMRDA § 401 (e), 29 U.S.C. § 481 (e) (1964). Section 401 (e) of the LMRDA
provides:
In any election required by this section which is to be held by secret ballot
a reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates and
MANAGEMENT FIELD, S. REP.

every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to
hold office (subject to section 504 of this title and to reasonable qualifications
uniformly imposed) and shall have the right to vote for or otherwise support
the candidate or candidates of his choice, without being subject to penalty,
discipline, or improper interference or reprisal of any kind by such organization or any member thereof ....
'LMRDA § 401(e), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1964). Additional requirements are
that international union elections must be held by secret ballot at least once every
three years. Specific provisions insure equality of treatment in the mailing of campaign literature, require adequate safeguards to insure a fair election, guarantee a
reasonable opportunity for the nomination of candidates and the right to vote. Id.

1391 U.S. 492 (1968).
8265 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"381 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1967).
10 391 U.S. at 499.
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IV, a candidacy limitation which renders 93 per cent of union members
ineligible for office can hardly be a 'reasonable qualification.' ,)1
The Court apparently sets down an "effect" rule in this case, surmising that if the bylaw severely limits the number of candidates then
it is per se unreasonable. In so doing it rejected the arguments advanced
by the local that the bylaw is necessary in view of the high annual turnover in membership, the multimillion-dollar budget of the local, and the
diverse interests of the various craft units.' 2 The Court analogized the
union election to public elections, declaring that the union's position
assumes "that rank-and-file union members are unable to distinguish qualified from unqualified candidates ... without a demonstration of a candidate's performance in other offices."' 3 Yet, it should be noted that even
though requirements for public office do not include previous holding of
office, requirements such as residency, competency and age are imposed on
candidates for public office to insure that the office-holder has both an interest in the position and demonstrable fitness, and arguably the condemned requirement in this case serves the same purpose in the union
election as the above mentioned requirements do in public elections. Perhaps a more careful evaluation of the particular interests of the union
would be desirable.
The Court, in interpreting another facet of section 401,14 effectively
extended the power of the Secretary of Labor to bring an action seeking
invalidation of union elections. In Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle
Blowers Association,'5 the Court held that when the Secretary proves the
existence of a section 401 violation that many have affected the outcome of
a challenged election, the fact that the union during the interim has conducted another unsupervised election does not deprive the Secretary of his
statutory right to a court order declaring the challenged election void and
directing a new election under his supervision. 16
The challenged bylaw in Local 153 required that union members attend
Id. at 502.

12381

F.2d at 505.

13391 U.S. at 504.
14

LMRDA § 401, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. § 401(e) (1964).

'

389 U.S. 463 (1968).

"Section 402 of LMRDA provides enforcement procedure for Section 401:
Upon investigation of a complaint duly filed by a member of a labor organization, the Secretary of Labor, if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation of the election provisions of the Act has occurred and has not been
remedied, may bring a civil action against the union as an entity, to set aside
the election and direct the conduct of an election under supervision of the
Secretary. LMRDA § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1964).
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at least seventy-five percent of the regular union meetings for a two-year
period in order to be eligible to run for office. The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit 17 held that the conducting of its next regular biennial
election while the appeal was pending rendered the question of the reasonableness of the bylaw moot. The'court of appeals stated that it would
serve no practical purpose to void an old election once the terms of office
conferred have been terminated by a new election. The Supreme Court
reversed and stated that the proper interpretation of section 401 is that once
the Secretary establishes that a violation of section 401 may have affected
the outcome of the challenged election, only a supervised election can
assure the members that the officers who achieved office as a result of
violations of the Act would not perpetuate their unlawful control in the
succeeding election.'"
The Court recognized that if the lawsuit is declared moot by an intervening election, the question of the reasonableness of the bylaw will probably never be determined because it is likely that the requisite amount of
time between elections will have expired before the case is heard on appeal.
For this reason the rule declared by the case appears practical and realistic.' 9
Relying on Local 153, the Court held in Wirtz v. Local Union No.
125, Laborer'sInternational Union of North America,20 that the Secre-

tary of Labor's cause of action under section 40221 is not limited to the
bare allegations made in a union member's complaint relating only to a
run-off election and not mentioning an earlier general election. The Court
stated that the Secretary can maintain an action challenging the earlier
general election when the union had "fair notice" that the same unlawful
conduct that occurred at the runoff election also occurred at the general
election. The Court so held although the statute requires that a union
member exhaust his intra-union remedies and file a complaint before the
Secretary can institute suit.22 Here the court found that the union had
"Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 372 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1966).
18389 U.S. 463 (1968).
For a discussion of the ramifications of this case, in which the decision is
criticized for being overbroad, see Note, The Election Labryrinth: An Inquiry into
Title IV of the LMRDA, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 336, 378 (1968).
20389 U.S. 477 (1968).
"LMRDA § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1964).
"Id. "A member of a labor organization ... who has exhaustcd the remedies
available mder the constitution and bylaws of such organization and of any parent
body, or . . . who has invoked such available remedies without obtaining a final
decision within three calendar months after their invocation, may file a complaint
with the Secretary .... " LMRDA § 402(a), (b), 29 U.S.C. § 482(a), (b) (1964)
(emphasis added). The Secretary must then investigate the complaint, and if he
'o
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fair notice that the same unlawful conduct which occurred at the runoff
election also occurred at the general election. In response to the challenge
that the Secretary's enforcement action is limited by what is alleged in
the union member's initial complaint, the Court reasoned that Congress
clearly did not intend that the Secretary be limited by "the artfulness of
a layman's complaint, which often must be based on incomplete information.1 23 In reply to the union's charge that the statute required prior exhaustion of internal remedies, the Court stated:
[U]nions [are] expected to provide responsible and responsive procedures for investigating ...

grievances. These intertwined objectives

are not disserved but furthered by permitting the Secretary to include
in his complaint at least any section 401 violations he has discovered
which the union had a fair opportunity to 2consider
and redress in con4
nection with a member's initial complaint.
This case obviously enlarges the power of the Secretary of Labor to
bring an action to invalidate a union election. Fair notice to the union
of previous unlawful conduct left unremedied by the union appears to be
the basic reason for the Court's holding. The construction of the statute,
however, to eliminate as a prerequisite exhaustion of internal remedies
as well as elimination of the private complaint requirement would appear
to reduce the independence and self-government of the union. These prerequisites are based on a policy of affording unions the opportunity to
correct their own errors and to encourage union responsibility, initiative
and self-discipline. 25 The opinion to some degree undermines this policy.
finds probable cause to believe a violation has occurred, he may bring suit against
the union. Id.
23389
24Id.

U.S. at 482.
at 484.

"The legislative history clearly indicates that a member must show that he has

pursued any remedies available to him within the union in a timely manner. S.
REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1959).

The rationale of the requirement
is that it preserves a "maximum amount of independence and self-government by
giving every international union the opportunity to correct improper local elections."

Id. See also Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72

HARV.

L.

REv. 609, 633 (1959). In addition, Title IV exhaustion requirements have heretofore been construed to prevent exceptions in their application. Wirtz v. Local 125,
Hod Carriers, 231 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Ohio 1964). See generally St. Antoine,

Landrum-Griffin, 1965-1966: A Calculus of Democratic Values, 19 N.Y.U. CoxFERENCE ON LABOR 35, 50-51 (1966). But see Beaird, Union, Officer Election Provisions of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 51 VA.
L. REv. 1306, 1326-27 (1965). Professor Beaird would eliminate the complaint
requirement altogether, arguing the "plain meaning of [the] authorization is that

the Secretary may bring a civil action based on any violation of title IV, and not
merely on the basis of violations previously charged by the complaining union
member." Id. at 1327.
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Perhaps the decision indicates less than full appreciation of the actual
mechanics of intra-union grievance procedures. The only apparent limitation on the Secretary's power is that the union have fair notice. In this
case the Court assumes the union had "fair notice" when in fact, because
of the numerous grievances and crowded agendas typical of unions today,
union officials probably dealt with the complaint strictly on its face. On
the other hand, the case may be interpreted as an indication that the
Court is fully aware of the intra-union procedures and this case is to
serve notice to the union to provide a union review procedure adapted to
give quick and fair redress to election violations.
UNION MEMBERSHIP

A union's expulsion of a member for failing to exhaust his intraunion remedies and appeals before filing an 8(b) (1) (A) 2" charge with
the NLRB was held unlawful in NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine

and Shipbuilding WorkersY7 The member filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the Board without first complying with the union's appeals
procedure and consequently violated the union's constitution, which required that a member exhaust the internal remedies before resorting to
any tribunal outside the union. The member was expelled by the union
for this violation, and the expulsion led to his filing the charge in this
case. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that a member could be expelled only when his complaint concerned solely an "internal union matter.""' This position stresses that the implementation of

the Act requires free access to the Board. The Court did not define an
"internal union matter," although the individual member's status with
respect to union discipline depends on that determination. If the mem" Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b) (1) (A), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964), which reads:
It shall he an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents...
to restrain or coerce ... employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 157 of this title: Provided,That this paragraph shall not impair the
right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition or retention of membership therein ...
It is further provided:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities ...and shall
also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities .... LaborManagement Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
"391 U.S. 418 (1968). See Note, Expulsion From a Union as an UnfairLabor
Practice,47 N.C.L. Rxv. 199 (1968). 2 391 U.S. at 428.,
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ber determines that the questioned activity is not an internal union affair,
and files a complaint, when in fact it is an internal matter requiring exhaustion of union procedures, he apparently can be disciplined.2 9 Thus,
although the rule of the case is clear that a union cannot expel a member
for failing to exhaust internal remedies before filing a charge, unless it
is plainly an "internal union matter," that determination must still be a
condition precedent to escaping union discipline.80
The permissive area of union discipline is thus narrowed by the Court
with the resultant fuller effectuation of the Board's protection of the
aggrieved individual's rights.
CONFLICT BETWEEN SECTION 301 OF THE LMRA AND SECTION
4 OF THE NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT

Since 1962 and Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 31 an accommodation between Section 432 and Section 30133 has been expected. The difficulty arises because section 301 (a)1 4 provides that "suits for violation
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization. . . may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties . . ." while section 4 or Norris-LaGuardia declares:

" LMRDA § 101(a) (4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4) (1964):
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute
an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency
.*. or the right of any member of a labor organization to appear as a witness
in any judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding or to petition any
legislature or to communicate with any legislature: Provided, That any such
member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not
to exceed a four month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings ...
"3The Court cites NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967),
as an example of a union's legitimate internal affair. However, see Scofield v.
NLRB, 393 F.2d 49, 54 (7th Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion) and Christensen,
Union Discipline Under Federal Law: Instiutional Dilemma in an Industrial Deviocracy, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 227, 265 (1968), both of which criticize Allis-Chalmers.
If the member's conduct is a protected activity, i.e., a right given by section 7, the
logical conclusion is that the activity is not "plainly an internal affair." But the
determination of what is a section 7 right is not a simple one as evidenced by AllisChalmers, where the Court determined that a member's refusal to engage in an
authorized strike is not a protected activity, because the power of the union to compel its members to solidify for the purpose of collective bargaining "is particularly
vital when the members engage in strikes." 388 U.S. at 181.
"370 U.S. 195 (1962).
Norris-LaGuardia Act, § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
"Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1965).
" Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301 (a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1965).
2
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No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case
involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or
persons participating or interested in such dispute ...

from doing...

any of the following acts: (a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any
work or to remain in any relation of employment ...
In Sinclair, the Court held that section 301 did not repeal section 4
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in labor-management contract enforcement
cases; therefore, no injunction could issue to enforce the no-strike provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
The resolution of the conflict between section 4 and section 301 is
necessary because an injunction may be the only adequate remedy for enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement. If the agreement contains
both a no-strike clause and a binding arbitration provision, as most do,
the only way for the agreement to be meaningful is for courts to have the
power to prevent strikes which violate the contract. As Mr. Justice Brennan stated in his dissent in Sinclair:
The enjoining of a strike over an arbitrable grievance may be indispensible to the effective enforcement of an arbitration scheme in a collective agreement; thus the power to grant that injunctive remedy may be
essential to the uncrippled performance of the Court's function under
section 301.3 5
InternationalLongshoreman'sAssociation, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia
Marine Trade Association 6 was the first case since Sinclair to confront
the Supreme Court with this accommodation issue. Instead of deciding
the issue, Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, bypassed the
question and reversed an enforcement order by the district court that had
compelled the union to cease striking when the strike violated the collective bargaining agreement. The Court simply held that the enforcement
order did not satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a), which requires that an
injunction specify the reason for its issuance.
The argument advanced by the union was that the district court did not
have power to issue the specific enforcement order because the order was
an injunction against work stoppages that is prohibited by section 4. The
employer argued that the order simply enforced an arbitrator's award, and
under section 301, a federal court can enforce an agreement to arbitrate.
The Court held that it was unnecessary to accommodate section 4 and
section 301:
gM389
370 U.S.
U.S. at
64 216-17.
(1967).
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[W]hatever power the district court might have possessed under the
circumstances disclosed by this record, the conclusion is inescapable
that the decree which the court in fact entered was too vague to be
sustained as a valid exercise of federal judicial authority....37
Avco Corp. v. Lodge 735, InternationalAssociation of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers's also presented to the court the accommodation issue
between section 4 and section 301. The employer and union had a contract that contained a non-strike clause and binding arbitration clause.
The union breached the contract by striking whereby the employer obtained
in a state court a temporary injunction enjoining the strike. The majority
again declined to discuss the issue and confined the decision to resolving
the lesser question of removal of a state court suit for violation of a
no-strike provision in a collective bargaining agreement to a federal district court. The majority held that the anti-injunctive provisions of
Norris-LaGuardia apply only to remedies, not to subject matter jurisdiction. The removal, therefore, from the state court to a federal court
was not barred because "an action arising under section 301 is controlled
by federal substantive law even though it is brought in a state court....
It is thus clear that the claim under this collective bargaining agreement
is one arising under the laws of the United States within the meaning of
the removal statutes."' 39
More important than the removal question, however, is the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, which expresses doubt as to the application of Sinclair, and states that the question of its validity would likely
be considered at "an appropriate future occasion."4 0
It would appear that the court missed an opportunity to decide the
question in Avco and PhiladelphiaMarine, but the concurrence provides
an indication that the Court has shifted on Sinclair and when the "appropriate future occasion arises," it seems likely that Sinclair will be overruled.
LABOR IMMUNITY FROM ANTITRUST LAWS

4" gave a
The Court, in American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll,
broad reading to the labor exemption from the antitrust laws.' A mu-

"'Id. at 73-74. Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring, and Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in part and dissenting in part, again asserted that accommodation between
the two sections is necessary.
- 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
8°
0 390 U.S. at 560.
4 Id. at 562.
"391 U.S. 99 (1968).
4'38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964). The basic policy of the antitrust laws
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sician's union had unilaterally established regulations of "club-date" engagements" of union members that in effect enforced a closed shop,
exerted pressures on non-union musicians acting as orchestra leaders to
become union members, imposed on all orchestra leaders a minimum
number of instrumentalists to be used, and required that the orchestra
leaders charge minimum prices for instrumentalists. Carroll, the plaintiff
in error, argued that these regulations established a violation of the
antitrust laws because they represented a combination in restraint of trade
between the union and the "non-labor" orchestra leaders. Carroll relied
on the court's exemption of union activity--when the activity promotes
the union's own self interest and does not involve a combination with
44
non-labor groups.
The facts showed that the union member musicians secured jobs
through union controlled booking agents when they acted as orchestra
leaders for single engagements. 4" The orchestras were staffed with musicians obtained from the union hiring hall, and the orchestra leaders
exercised typical management functions with respect to these employees.40
Plaintiffs in Carroll were all full time non-union leaders and maintained
offices and employed personnel to solicit engagements, but they were forced
to abide by the union regulations as if they were union leaders.
The majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice White and Black disis to eliminate undue restraints on competition. Yet the policy of federal labor legis-

lation is the equalization of bargaining power between business and labor, which

requires, in most instances, concentration of power. For a discussion of the unavoidability of the conflict between these two policies, see Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 16-30 (1963).
" "Club dates" are one time engagements of orchestras to provide music at
social events. The purchaser of the music arranges with the orchestra leader or his
booking agent for an orchestra consisting of a "leader" and a certain number of
instrumentalists. The orchestra leaders often book more than one orchestra at
the same time and hire "subleaders" to do the actual leading when they themselves
do not appear. Carroll v. American Federation of Musicians of U.S. & Canada,
372 F.2d 155, 159 (1967).
"The recent history of the labor antitrust exemption began with United States
v. Hutchison,, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), where the Court stated that most labor union
activity is exempted from antitrust liability so long as the "union acts in its own
self interest and does not combine with non-labor groups." Id. at 232.
'"A few musicians acted solely as leaders while others did so only occasionally.
The average leader spent most of his time as a band musician, but occasionally
he obtained a club date as a leader.
"'Among the duties exercised by the leaders were collecting the fees, supervising the musicians, paying the musicians, and withholding taxes. The court of
appeals concluded that because the orchestra leaders acted no differently from other
independent contractors, they were employers. 372 F.2d at 159.
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senting, determined that because of job and wage competition between
the union orchestra members and the non-union leaders, the orchestra
leaders constituted a "labor group," thus coming within the labor exemption of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. 7
The majority also found that the setting of minimum prices implemented a legitimate union interest because the minimum prices operated
to protect the wages of the subleader and instrumentalists." The dissent
argued that a distinction between the different roles played by the orchestra leaders is necessary, because leading a band possesses economic interrelationships affecting legitimate union interests, but managing a business
that solicits club dates and hires sub-leaders does not. When a leader
does not perform, he is acting solely in an entrepreneurial capacity; the
legitimate union interest cannot extend to setting his minimum prices
but only to ensuring designated set salaries. Also, since those leaders
who never perform do not constitute a labor group, a conspiracy between
them and the union is an unprotected conspiracy in restraint of trade.
In attempting to define the limits of labor immunity from the antitrust
laws, the Court has relied on the coverage of labor laws designed to protect labor groups.4 9 Non-labor groups are not exempted from the Sherman
Act and therefore cannot combine with a union, or among themselves.
The majority determined that the orchestra leaders were a labor group
on the basis of the "presence of a job or wage competition or some other
economic interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests between
the union members" and the orchestra leaders. This test for identifying
a labor group was derived from a series of cases dealing with the issue of
' Clayton Act §§ 6, 20, 15 U.S.C. § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964), provide that labor

is not an article of commerce or commodity, and restrict the issuance of injunctions

by federal courts.
" The Court reasoned that the legitimate union interest implemented by the
minimum price requirement prevented the performing leaders from undercutting the
union leader wage through their failure to recover their expenses plus wages.
The non-performing leaders were likewise required to collect the necessary amount
required to pay the full union scale to subleaders and instrumentalists.
" The Norris-LaGuardia Act grants immunity from injunctive proceedings in

federal courts and from liability for violations of the antitrust laws, requiring only

that the activity arise in the context of a "labor dispute." Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4,
47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964). The Act defines "labor dispute" to
include any controversy over efforts to negotiate, fix, maintain or change the terms
or conditions of employment. 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964). The
Court has expanded the exemption to mean that if a union acts in its own self-

interest and does not combine with a non-labor group its activity will be exempt
from the operation of the antitrust laws. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325
U.S. 797 (1945); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 234-35 (1941).
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whether a union could organize and regulate independent contractors. If
there existed job or wage competition affecting legitimate union interests
between the union members and the independent contractors, the contractors were a "labor group" and party to a labor dispute under the NorrisLaGuardia Act. 50
The use of the labor-nonlabor test, as noted by the dissent, is complicated in Carroll by the fact that the orchestra leaders play a dual role:
they act as workers when they lead orchestras, but as businessmen when
they perform the function of organizing club dates for orchestras. Indeed,
at least in part the combination is between a "labor" group and a "nonlabor" group, and thus there is a need to protect the public from a sophisticated market restraint that may be imposed by a strong union. It would
appear that balancing the union's interest against the public harm resulting
from the market restraint would be a better test than the labor-nonlabor
test employed by the Court.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS

In NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America,5 1 the Court considered

the scope of judicial review of factual determinations made by the NLRB.
In this case the issue was whether "debit agents" of the insurance company were employees and included within the unit, thereby requiring the
insurance company to bargain collectively with the union, or whether they
were independent contractors. The Board examined the facts, applied the
common-law agency test of control, 2 and concluded they were employees.53 The court of appeals held that the Board's findings were
tainted, stating that "there is too much which detracts from the weight of
the evidence relied upon to support [their] findings and conclusions,"
and thus refused to enforce the Board's bargaining order.54 The Supreme
Court, however, said that the Board's determination was a judgment
made after hearings with witnesses and after oral arguments had been
" For a general discussion, see Comment, Labor's Antitrust Exemption After
Pennington and Jewel Tea, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 742 (1966); Note, Labor Law and
Antitrust: "So Deceptive and Opaque Are the Elements of These Problems." 1966
DuxE

L.J. 191.

U.S. 254 (1968).
For cases illustrating the ordinary tests of the law of agency as required by
the Taft-Hartley Act, see NLRB v. A. S. Abell Co., 327 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1964);
National Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 273 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Steinberg, 182 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1950).
' United Ins. Co. of America, 154 N.L.R.B. 38 (1965).
United Ins. Co. of America v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 316, 324-25 (7th Cir. 1966).
l390
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held and that "such a determination should not be set aside just because
a court would, as an original matter, decide the case the other way." 5
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB 56 established the principle that
factual findings of the Board are to be accepted if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole. But the case also held that
"a reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when
it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is
substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board's view."5 7
Yet, the court of appeals in this case stated that they found "no support
in the record for some of these findings and but tenuous support for
others. Those which are supported by substantial evidence are. .. consistent with an independent contractor status." 8s
The Court appears then to have granted to the Board greater autonomy in its fact finding functions. This increased autonomy, combined
with the judicial deference given to questions of judgment "peculiarly
within the competence of the agency,"5 could mean a substantial amount
of finality will be given to the Board's findings. If in fact UnitedInsurance
Co. does stand for the suggested diminished scope of judicial review, the,
case has undermined to some degree the position of the judiciary as aL
check on the arbitrariness of administrative action.
FEDERAL PREEMPTION

-

-"

Since the Wagner Act in 1935, the Court has determined the extent
to which state legislation must yield to overriding federal labor policy.
Recently the Court concluded that a ruling by the Florida Industrial
390 U.S. at 260.
'340 U.S. 474 (1951).
Id. at 488. See the Court's construction of Universal Camera in NLRB v.
Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404 (1962). In this connection, Eastern Greyhound
Lines v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1964), reiterates the observation made in
NLRB v. Elias Bros. Big Boy, Inc., 327 F.2d 421, 426 (6th Cir. 1964) that "[i]n a
proper case (the reviewing court) may decline to follow the action of an examiner
in crediting and discrediting testimony, even though the Board has adopted the
Examiner's findings." Similarly, in Portable Elec. Tools, Inc. v. NLRB, 309 F.2d
423 (7th Cir. 1962), the court stated: "While recognizing that the question of
credibility is for the trial examiners, an Appeals Court is not precluded from independently determining what weight certain testimony which he finds credible
should be given when evaluating the evidence on the record as a whole." Id. at
426.
18 371 F.2d at 322.
"See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Universal Camera, 340 U.S. 474,

488 (1951).
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Commission that a person who is unemployed forfeits his right to receive
unemployment compensation if he files an unfair labor practice charge
against his employer, violated the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution. 0
In Nash v. FloridaIndustrial Commission,6" the petitioner was laid-off
because of alleged slow production. She was allowed unemployment compensation up to the time she filed an unfair labor practice charge against
her employer, but was denied compensation after filing the charge pursuant
to a state statute which denied compensation when the unemployment
results from a labor dispute. 2 In an 8-0 decision, the Court held the
ruling violates the supremacy clause of the Constitution because it frustrates enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act. The Court noted
that the Board cannot initiate unfair labor practice proceedings unless
some person charges that another has committed such practices.6 The
ruling by the Florida Industrial Commission has the effect of giving an
employee who believes he has been wrongly discharged two choices: "(1)
he may keep quiet and receive unemployment compensation until he finds
a new job or (2) he may file an unfair labor practice charge, thus under
Florida procedure surrendering his right to unemployment compensation,
and risk financial ruin if the litigation is protracted."6 4 In either case
the ruling is "' an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress' " and therefore invalid. 5
The Court determined that because Congress expressly prohibits action
by an employer that discriminates against an employee who files an unfair
labor practice charge,66 the same activity by a state is similarly prohibited.617 Generally, the weights to be assigned to the state interest are easily
determined when federal purpose is inescapably clear.6" In this case the
Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967).
"1389 U.S. 235 (1967).
" Florida's Unemployment Compensation Law, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 443.06(4) (b)

00

(1966), provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for [unemployment] benefits... [f] or any
week with respect to which the commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a labor dispute in active progress which exists at the
factory, establishment or other premises at which he is or was last employed...
03 389 U.S. at 238.
61Id. at 239.
"Id. at 238, quoting Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538,'542 (1945).
0029 U.S.C. § 158(a) (4) (1964).
07 389 U.S. at 239.
,8 State regulatory power has 'generally been fdund to be preempted in three situations: (1) when Congress has shown an intent completely to occupy the field,
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intention of Congress is clear and any substantial restriction of the individual's access to the Board by an employer, union, and now -state, must
yield to overriding federal policy.
EMPLOYER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

Reinstatement
In NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailers Co.,69 the Court held that employees
who apply for reinstatement after the end of an economic strike, and before
full production is resumed, are entitled to reinstatement if and when jobs
become available for which they are qualified. This ruling applies even if
the employer has no need for their services on the day they apply for
work. The employee retains his status until he has obtained other regular
and substantially equivalent employment.
First Amendment and Private Property
The Supreme Court held in Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590
v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.7" that the first amendment right to picket
can be exercised on private property that has been opened to the public.
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. owned a shopping center in which Weis Markets,
Inc. operated a grocery store. Peaceful picketing by non-employees of
Weis began in the parcel pickup area and the parking lot adjacent to the
supermarket. Logan Valley obtained an ex parte order enjoining any
picketing except outside the shopping center. On appeal to the state supreme court, the injunction was affirmed 7 on the sole ground that the
union was trespassing on private property. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed:
e.g., Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926); (2) where a direct
conflict exists between state law and the express provisions of a federal law, e.g.,
Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) ; and (3) when state legislation conflicts with
the full accomplishment of congressional purposes and objectives, e.g., Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). Traditionally, the Supreme Court first determines
whether Congress intended to preEmpt the field, and then examines whether the

state activity complained of falls within the prohibited area. See, e.g., Pennsylvania
v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956) ; H. P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S.
79, 84 (1939). Access to the Board by a union member is expressly provided for in
the National Labor Relations Act, and this fact made determination of this case much
easier for the Court.
n'389 U.S. 375 (1967). See generally Note, Labor Law-DecreasingImportance
of Employer Motivation as an Element of Unfair Labor Practices,46 N.C.L. Rnv.
975 (1968).
°391 U.S. 308 (1968).
'425 Pa. 382, 227 A.2d 874 (1967).
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because the shopping center serves as the community business block
'and is freely accessible and open to the people in the area and those
passing through,' the State may not delegate the power, through the
use of its trespass laws, wholly to exclude those members of the
public wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on the premises in a manner and for a purpose generally consonant with the use
72
to which the property is actually put.
The majority, through Mr. Justice Marshall, cited Marsh v. Alabama 7
for the proposition that under some circumstances privately owned property may be treated as publicly owned. In Marsh, the Gulf Shipbuilding
Corp. owned the town and prevented the distribution of leaflets by a
Jehovah's Witness on the sidewalk in front of the business block, on the
theory of trespass to private property. The Court held that "ownership
does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his
advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the
more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."'74 The Court reversed the conviction for
the leaflet distribution because a traveler could make free use of the
facilities available. "In short the town and its shopping district [were]
accessible to and freely used by the public in general and there [was]
nothing to distinguish them from any other town and shopping center
except the fact that the title to the property belongs to a private corporation." 7 The majority in Logan noted the similarities between the business block in Marsh and the shopping center in Logan and stated that the
shopping center is clearly the functional equivalent to the business district
in Marsh.70
77
The question presented has been decided by several state courts.
The concurring opinion in Freeman v. Retail Clubs Local 1207, a
Washington state decision, 7s adopted a five-point test in considering what
would otherwise be a unlawful trespass when a person comes on private
property for the purpose of exercising his right of free speech: (1) when
,2 391 U.S. at 319-20.
"326 U.S. 501 (1946).
74 Id.
at 506.
75 Id. at 503.
76 391 U.S. at 318.
17 E.g., Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery Workers Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d
766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965);
Freeman v. Retail Clubs Local 1207, 58 Wash. 2d 426, 363 P.2d 803 (1961).
"58 Wash. 2d 426, 431, 363 P.2d 803, 806 (1961).
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the private property owner designs his property for use by the general
public in such a manner as to make it difficult or impossible to distinguish
its physical characteristics from public-owned property similarly so devoted; (2) when the exercise of the right of free speech is for the purpose
of making a communication to persons naturally upon the premises; (3)
had the property been public, the communication would be permitted; (4)
interference with the owner's fundamental rights of privacy or personal
use and occupancy is not involved; and (5) the trespasser has no place
or means available as a realistic or practical alternate. These criteria
apply as well to Logan. Even though the Court never sets them forth as
such, each is considered and carefully weighed. Arguably, the Court
adopts them as the factors to be considered in this type of case."9
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

The State of Maryland, with twenty-seven other states intervening as
parties plaintiff, sought to have the 1966 Amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act8 0 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendments) declared
unconstitutional insofar as they applied to state employees who worked in
the public schools and hospitals."'
Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938 to correct and
eliminate labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of a minimum
standard of living by providing for a minimum wage for employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. In 1961,
an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, introduced the "enterprise" concept whereby employees involved in all the related activities of
a business engaged in commerce are brought under the coverage of the
act, even though part of the activities are not strictly "commerce" or the
"production of goods for commerce."8 " In 1966, the act was amended
again so that the "enterprise concept" was defined to include the activities
" One state court relied almost exclusively on the first factor and reached the
same result. In Moreland v. Retail Store Employees Local 444, 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114
N.W.2d 876 (1962), the court stated that if the facts showed the sidewalks appeared
to be public in nature then the conclusion would be that the property rights of the
shopping center owner would have to yield to the rights of freedom of speech that
attend peaceful picketing. See generally, for evaluation of the interests involved
in this type of case, Comment, The Unions, Free Speech, and the Shopping Center,
37 S. CAL. L. Ryv. 573 (1964).
go29 U.S.C. § 201 (1964), as amended (Supp. III, 1968).
"1Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
"29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1964), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (Supp. III,
1968).
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performed by persons in both public and private, profit and non-profit
schools and hospitals."s
The constitutionality of the Amendments was attacked on two major
grounds: (1) the very essence of the "enterprise" concept as originally
embodied in the 1961 Amendments was attacked as an unconstitutional
extension of the commerce power;84 and (2) the activities of the States
in the schools and hospitals are purely governmental, non-profit, and neither
in competition with, nor capable of, effective substitution for any private
system and cannot be included within any legitimate definition of com85
merce.
The first argument, that the "enterprise concept" was an unconstitutional expansion of congressional power over commerce in that it extended coverage to individuals in no way related to interstate commerce,
was rejected almost summarily by the Court. Mr. Justice Harlan, writing
for the majority, concluded that United States v. Darby"0 settled the
question of the constitutionality of the "enterprise concept." 87 In Darby,
the Court stated that Congress could regulate intrastate activities when
they have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Substandard wages
and excessive hours have a substantial effect on interstate commerce because the employer who pays the substandard wages has a competitive
advantage over other employers who pay the higher wage. Once the above
is determined, then there is a rational basis for the logical inference that
the pay and hours of production affect a company's competitive position.
The next logical step, said the Court, is the determination that when a
company does an interstate business, its competition with companies elsewhere is affected by all its labor costs, and not only the costs of production employees." Therefore, all employees are included within the scope
" The 1966 Amendments provide in pertinent part:
Enterprise engaged in commerce.., means an enterprise which has employees
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, including
employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods that have been
moved in or produced for commerce by any person, and which ... (4) is
engaged in the operation of a hospital, an institution primarily engaged in
the care of the sick, the aged, the mentally ill ... a school for mentally or
physically handicapped or gifted children, an elementary or secondary school,

or an institution of higher education (regardless of whether or not such
hospital, institution, or school is public or private or operated for profit or

not for profit).
84392 U.S. at 188.
Id.at 193.
"312 U.S. 100 (1941).
' 392 U.S. at 188:
88Id. at 190.
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of federal labor legislation even though not all employees of the enterprise
have any direct relationship to interstate commerce. Furthermore, said
Mr. Justice Harlan, the "enterprise concept" is supported by the policy
of peaceful labor relations. Substandard labor conditions tend to lead to
labor disputes and strikes, which impedes the flow of goods in interstate
9
commerce.8
The second argument advanced by the states was that the commerce
power does not afford a constitutional basis for extension of the Act to
hospital and schools operated by the states. This argument was made in
terms that the 1966 Amendments unconstitutionally impugn the states'
sovereignty by unduly interfering with their function of providing citizens
with hospitals and schools. The Court noted that the Act specifically
exempts any employee engaged in executive, adminstrative, or professional
capacity. "The Act establishes only a minimum wage and a maximum
limit of hours . .. and does not otherwise affect the way in which school
and hospital duties are performed." 90 Therefore, Congress is not telling
the states how to perform their medical and educational functions. Furthermore, state interests may not constitutionally "outweigh" the importance of a valid federal statute which regulates commerce. 9 1
The Court acknowledged that the power to regulate commerce has
limits, but the broad language in the opinion suggests that the commerce
power is all-inclusive. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, declared that the
use of the "enterprise" concept shows the immense scope of the commerce power, and states that if "constitutional principles of federalism
raise no limits to the commerce power where regulation of state activities
are concerned, could Congress compel the States to build superhighways
crisscrossing their territory in order to accommodate interstate vehicles,
...If ...this can be done, then the National Government could devour
the essentials of state sovereignty, though that sovereignty is attested by
'9 2
the Tenth Amendment."
CONCLUSION

The problem in interpreting new labor legislation is evident in the
decisions during the past Term. Yet the Court makes clear that it views
"O
392 U.S. at 191. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937), which held that peaceful labor relations provide a "rational basis" for
statutes regulating labor conditions.
90392 U.S. at 193.
01 Id.at 198.
02 Id. at 204.
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the role of the Secretary of Labor as one ensuring that the individual member have a right to participate in a democratic and responsible union
election procedure. Also, a trend of the cases indicates that access to a
formal grievance hearing will be afforded to any individual challenging
societal institutions. In addition, it is significant that the Board's views
appear in harmony with that of the Court, resulting in the affirmance of
all four cases heard on appeal from the Board.
JAMES M. MILEs

